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Abstract
We examine incentives to seize and defend goods offered for trade in an Edgeworth box
economy. Appropriation possibilities generate an equilibrium of coerced redistribution and
voluntary trade in a reduced box. Potential mutual gains remain untaken because the prospect of
piracy creates a price wedge, wherein the effective relative price is lowered for the exporter and
raised for the importer. As the vulnerability of one or both goods increases, the price wedge
widens, causing trade to diminish. If vulnerability becomes sufficiently high, then trade and
appropriation are driven to zero, or one or both players are rendered indifferent to trade.
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ANDERTON & CARTER:  VULNERABLE TRADE 
The Edgeworth box, simple as it is, is remarkably powerful.  There are virtually 
no phenomena or properties of general equilibrium exchange economies that 
cannot be depicted in it (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, 521). 
 
[I]t may be assumed that very shortly after men began the transport of goods from 
one point to another various enterprising individuals arose who saw profit in 
intercepting these goods on the way (Gosse, ([1932] 1968, 1). 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Central to the field of conflict economics is the premise that appropriation stands coequal 
with production and trade as a fundamental category of economic activity.  In the words of 
Hirshleifer's (1994, 2) presidential address before the Western Economic Association: 
... the mainline Marshallian tradition has ... almost entirely overlooked what I will call the 
dark side of the force....[S]ure, you can produce goods for the purpose of mutually beneficial 
exchange with other parties – OK, that’s Marshall’s “ordinary business.”  But there’s another 
way to get rich; you can grab goods that someone else has produced.  Appropriating, 
grabbing, confiscating what you want – and, on the flip side, defending, protecting, 
sequestering what you already have – that’s economic activity too. 
Resource allocations to appropriation and defense fundamentally affect the acquisition and 
retention of wealth.  Moreover, production, trade, and relative prices are reshaped by 
appropriation in ways that are generally ignored in mainstream economics. 
Appropriation possibilities are part of the everyday human condition.  This is most obvious 
in less developed economies experiencing tyranny, corruption, criminal syndicates, or civil war.  
In such settings insecure property rights create strong incentives for appropriation and defense.  
For example, traders who bring their goods to market must allocate resources to protect their 
goods along the way.  If trade is sufficiently vulnerable to appropriation, would-be traders may 
find that autarky is the better option.  More generally, appropriative struggles in insecure 
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economies redistribute wealth, reduce consumption, diminish investment, and dampen 
specialized production and trade, as documented in Collier et al. (2003).  Even in economies with 
ostensibly secure property rights, appropriation possibilities pervade economic life.  Electronic 
and video security systems; piracy of music, software, and motion pictures; and common theft 
are but a few examples of appropriation possibilities at work in modern economies.  Even a 
commonplace vending machine is, upon closer look, a sophisticated piece of defense capital 
designed to induce exchange rather than appropriation. 
Economists have begun to incorporate Hirshleifer's dark side of behavior into mainstream 
general equilibrium models of economic activity.  The common theme linking these models is 
that appropriation activity is costly in terms of forgone production and/or exchange.  Also 
common is the use of contest success functions whereby appropriative outcomes are determined 
by competing resources and conflict technology.  The models differ primarily with respect to 
which categories of economic activity are considered.  In this regard, conflict models fall into 
three groups.  Perhaps best known are models that combine production and appropriation; other 
models include exchange and appropriation; and a few models allow all three activities.1 
We present a model of vulnerable trade which, as the name suggests, focuses on the 
interaction of exchange and appropriation and hence falls in the second group of conflict models 
above.  Our starting point is a standard Edgeworth box, notable for its relative simplicity and 
widespread recognition among economists.  We introduce appropriation opportunities by 
assuming that while endowments are secure, goods are vulnerable to appropriation once offered 
for trade.  Beginning from a situation of secure trade, we ask what are the economic effects of 
increased vulnerability of one or both goods.  Our model is differentiated from most others in 
that we assume traded goods rather than endowments are subject to appropriation; we permit the 
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degree of vulnerability to differ between goods; and we show that vulnerability can generate 
autarky as an equilibrium outcome.2 
II.  A MODEL OF VULNERABLE TRADE 
General Model 
As in the classical Edgeworth box, we assume two players A and B with well-behaved 
preferences over two goods X and Y.  The players can be individuals or groups (including 
countries).  Initial endowments XiE  and 
Y
iE  (i = A, B) are such that if trade occurs, A will import 
X and export Y.  Goods designated for trade are subject to appropriation and are called gross 
exports.  Exports remaining after appropriation are exchanged at Walrasian market prices PX and 
PY and are called realized exports.3  For simplicity, we assume each good is attacked and 
defended out of initial endowments of that same good.  To follow the notation, think of h as 
height of fortification and g as guns used for attack.  Then Player A diverts XAg  of its X 
endowment toward the appropriation of B’s gross exports of X, which B protects by diverting XBh  
of its X endowment to defensive effort.  Likewise, B allocates YBg  of its Y endowment toward the 
appropriation of A’s gross exports, while A allocates YAh  of its Y endowment to protect them. 
Appropriation possibilities over traded goods are determined by a contest success function 
wherein the proportion of gross exports realized in exchange depends on the levels of 
fortification and defense together with a good-specific vulnerability parameter jZ  (j = X,Y): 
(1) 0,0,00010   with ),,( 2211321 ><<<>≤≤= ff, f, f, frZghfr YAYYBYAYA  
(2) 0,0,00010   with ),,( 2211321 ><<<>≤≤= ff, f, f, frZghfr XBXXAXBXB . 
In equation (1), the proportion of A’s gross exports of Y not appropriated by B and hence realized 
by A is YAr .  This proportion varies directly with A’s defensive effort 
Y
Ah , inversely with B’s 
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appropriation effort YBg , and inversely with good Y's vulnerability Z
Y.  Equation (2) shows the 
analogous retention rate XBr  for B’s gross exports of X.  The proportion of A’s gross exports 
appropriated by B is then )1( YAr− , while the proportion of B’s gross exports appropriated by A is 
)1( XBr− .  Without loss of generality, we assume XY ZZ ≥ , such that good Y is at least as 
vulnerable as good X. 
Turning to player A’s optimization problem, recall that A imports good X and exports good Y.  
A's consumption expenditures equal A
Y
A
X YPXP + .  Under vulnerable trade, A's disposable 
income is the value of initial endowments net of resources diverted for conflict, plus any X 
seized in trade from B, and minus any Y seized in trade by B.  A’s endowment of X net of 
resources employed to seize X is XA
X
A gE − .  B’s gross exports of X are BXBXB XhE −− , of which 
A seizes the proportion ( )XBr−1 .  A’s endowment of Y net of resources used to protect its exports 
of Y is YA
Y
A hE − .  Its gross exports are AYAYA YhE −− , of which A loses the proportion ( )YAr−1 .  
Equating expenditures to disposable income and dividing through by YP yields  
A’s budget constraint, where YX PPP /≡  denotes the world relative price of X: 
(3) )]1)(([)]1)(([ YAA
Y
A
Y
A
Y
A
Y
A
X
BB
X
B
X
B
X
A
X
AAA rYhEhErXhEgEPYPX −−−−−+−−−+−=+ . 
Solving (3) for XA leads to: 
(4) YAA
Y
A
Y
A
X
BB
X
B
X
B
X
A
X
AA rYhEPrXhEgEX ))(/1()1)(( −−+−−−+−= . 
Assuming Cournot/Nash behavior, A’s maximization problem is: 
(5) ]),,,([max
,,
A
X
A
Y
AAA
ghY
YghYXU
X
A
Y
AA
, 
where the function ),,( XA
Y
AAA ghYX  is defined by (4). 
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The first-order conditions for an interior solution to (5) are: 
(6) 0)/1( =+−
AA Y
Y
AX UrPU     ⇒ )/()/( YAYX rPUU AA =  
(7) ( ) 0]))[(/1( =−∂∂−− YAYAYAAYAYAX rhrYhEPU A  ⇒ ( ) YAYAYAAYAYA rhrYhE =∂∂−− )(  
(8) ( ) 0]1)1()[( =−∂−∂−− XAXBBXBXBX grXhEU A  ⇒ ( ) 1)1()( =∂−∂−− XAXBBXBXB grXhE . 
Equations (6)-(8) capture the key tradeoffs for player A in the vulnerable trade model. 
Equation (6) shows that consumption is extended to the point where the marginal rate of 
substitution between XA and YA equals the effective relative price of X, which is YArP / .  To 
understand the effective price, suppose the world relative price of X is 1=P  and A's retention 
ratio is 5.0=YAr .  In order to import an additional unit of X, A will have to divert 2Y from 
consumption and make it available for export.  Half of the 2Y will be appropriated, leaving as 
realized exports 1Y exchanged for the unit of X.  Hence, the opportunity cost to A for a unit of X 
is YrP YA 25.0/1/ == .  In the special case of classical trade, appropriation is impossible, 1=YAr , 
and equation (6) reduces to the standard optimization condition.  With vulnerable trade, YAr  falls 
below 1, such that A's effective price of X is raised above the world price, thus discouraging A's 
imports and consumption of X. 
Equation (7) shows how A utilizes resources to defend its gross exports of Y.  Defensive 
effort YAh  is extended to the point where the additional exports realized equal the incremental 
exports forgone through the drain of resources for protection.  Exports realized and exports 
forgone due to the marginal unit of fortification are ( )( )YAYAAYAYA hrYhE ∂∂−− /  and YAr .  Hence, 
equation (7) balances the marginal benefits and marginal costs of using resources for export 
defense. 
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Equation (8) shows how A utilizes resources to attack B’s gross exports of X.  Appropriation 
effort XAg  is extended to the point where the increment in M seized equals the amount of M lost 
through the drain of resources for attack.  Marginal X appropriated and marginal X lost from the 
allocation of resources to attack are ( )XAXBBXBXB grXhE ∂−∂−− /)1()(  and 1.  Hence, equation (8) 
balances the marginal benefits and marginal costs of using resources to attack B’s gross exports. 
Similar modeling applies to player B, who faces an effective relative price of X equal to 
X
BPr .  To continue the example above, suppose 1=P  and 5.0=XBr .  When B diverts from 
consumption a unit of X for export, half will be appropriated, leaving 0.5X as realized exports 
exchanged for 0.5Y.  Hence, B's effective price for a unit of X is YPr XB 5.0)5.0(1 == .  Notice 
that when XBr  falls below 1 with vulnerable trade, B's effective price of X is lowered below the 
world price, thus discouraging B's export and encouraging B's consumption of X. 
From the above we obtain six first-order conditions and two budget constraints that together 
define the optimal consumption levels and resource allocations for players A and B.  We close 
the system with a price equation whereby the value of A's realized exports equals the same for B: 
(9) XBB
X
B
X
B
XY
AA
Y
A
Y
A
Y rXhEPrYhEP )()( −−=−−  ⇒ XBBXBXBYAAYAYA rXhErYhEP )()( −−−−=  
The nine equations are assumed to define a Nash equilibrium in XA, YA, YAh , 
X
Ag , XB, YB, 
X
Bh , 
Y
Bg , 
and P. 
Graphical Illustration with Complete Symmetry 
Figure 1 illustrates how the economic landscape is changed when appropriation opportunities 
are introduced in an Edgeworth box economy.  We invoke several assumptions which together 
constitute what we call complete symmetry.  We begin by assuming that players A and B have 
equal cross endowments ( YB
X
A EE =  and XBYA EE = ).  This gives rise to a square Edgeworth box 
ANDERTON & CARTER:  VULNERABLE TRADE 
 7
and an initial endowment point at a on the off-diagonal.  We assume that the preferences of A 
and B are identical and homothetic, thus generating a linear contract curve.  We also assume that 
the two goods are weighted equally in the utility function ( 1==YXMRS ).  The equal weight 
assumption, identical preferences, and a square Edgeworth box imply that the absolute value of 
the slope of the off-diagonal is the relative world price (or terms of trade) of X and equals one 
( 0.1== YX PPP ).  Player A imports am units of good X and exports me units of good Y (with B 
the other side of the trade), and equilibrium consumption occurs at point e. 
Now assume that exports of each good are equally vulnerable to appropriation with 
YX ZZ = .  Given the symmetry assumptions above, each player will allocate an equal amount of 
resources to defense of exports ( hhh XB
Y
A == ) and attack of imports ( ggg YBXA == ).  Resources 
allocated to attack and defense are not available for consumption.  Hence, the Edgeworth box 
shrinks by h+g along each dimension, giving rise to the dashed box shown in Figure 1.  The 
drain of resources for attack and defense also shifts the endowment point from a to b in the 
figure.  Under the symmetry assumptions, point b will lie on the off-diagonal of the reduced 
Edgeworth box.  Because the upper and right boundaries of the reduced box constitute the 
effective axes for player B, B’s indifference curves also shift relative to the original Edgeworth 
box.  The shrinkage of the Edgeworth box is the resource cost effect of appropriation 
possibilities and is determined endogenously in the model. 
The two basic activities of appropriation and exchange combine to determine final 
consumption at point d in Figure 1.  Appropriation of traded goods moves the economy from b 
to c, while realized exchange carries the economy from c to d.  Player A’s gross exports of good 
Y encompass bj units seized by B together with ck units successfully exchanged.  Under 
symmetry, the same amounts apply to player B for good X.  Because point d lies on the off-
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diagonal of the reduced box, players A and B have equal cross consumptions and P remains 
equal to 1.0.  We define a good’s piracy rate as the percentage of a player’s gross exports that 
are appropriated, which is 100*bj/(bj+ck) in Figure 1.  We define a good’s trade destruction rate 
as the percentage decline of a player’s realized exports relative to exports in a classic Edgeworth 
box economy, which is 100*(me-ck)/me in Figure 1.  The piracy and trade destruction rates (and 
thus the location of points c and d on the new off-diagonal) are determined endogenously. 
Notice in Figure 1 that a region of mutual gain remains at the final consumption point d.  
This is due to the wedge effect of appropriation possibilities whereby the relative prices of X 
observed by A and B fail to converge.  At point d, the players' marginal rates of substitution 
equal their corresponding effective relative prices of X.  Hence, player A's marginal rate of 
substitution at point d is YA
Y
A rrP 1= .  Even though player A’s marginal valuation of X is greater 
than the world price, A is indifferent to importing a marginal unit of X at a price of 1.0 because of 
anticipated piracy.  Given the piracy rate for Y, in order to finance the import of a unit of X, A 
would have to make available for export YArP  units of Y, which is just equal to A’s subjective 
value of X in consumption.  On the other side, player B is indifferent to exporting a marginal unit 
of X at a contractual price of 1.0, because given the piracy of X, B would realize as net payment 
only XBPr  units of Y, just equal to B’s subjective value of X in consumption.  In summary, the 
divergent effective prices discount for anticipated piracy and thereby restrain trade. 
Figure 1 also demonstrates the utility losses associated with the resource cost and wedge 
effects of appropriation possibilities.  Focusing on player A, the decline in utility from U2 to U1 is 
due to the resource cost effect.  The additional decline in utility, from U1 to U0, is associated with 
the wedge effect.  Given symmetry, the same utility losses hold for player B. 
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Lastly, note that Figure 1 implies that each player prefers vulnerable trade to autarky.  Player 
A’s indifference curve through point d is higher than A’s indifference curve through point a.  
Hence, player A (and by symmetry, player B) prefers vulnerable trade to autarky (U0 > Ua).  
However, if appropriation possibilities are sufficiently strong, the resource cost and wedge 
effects could result in indifference curve U0 lying below the indifference curve through point a.  
In this case autarky would be the equilibrium prediction of the vulnerable trade model. 
III.  EXAMPLES OF VULNERABLE TRADE 
Additional Assumptions 
As noted in the introduction, our primary focus is on the economic effects of increased 
vulnerability of one or both goods.  To explore the comparative statics, we begin by 
operationalizing the symmetry assumptions of the illustration above.  Specifically, we assume 
that players A and B have an identical constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function 
ρρρ /1)( YXU += .  Hence, preferences are homothetic with a marginal rate of substitution of 
unity given equal amounts of X and Y.  The CES function has an elasticity of substitution σ equal 
to )1/(1 ρ−  and converges to a Cobb-Douglas function 2/12/1 YXU =  for 0=ρ .  As above, we 
assume that A and B hold equal cross endowments such that the initial endowment point lies on 
the cross diagonal of a square Edgeworth box. 
Throughout the examples we assume ratio-form contest success functions: 
(10) )/( YB
YY
A
Y
A
Y
A gZhhr +=  
(11) )/( XA
XX
B
X
B
X
B gZhhr +=  
with ZY ≥ ZX.  If no resources are allocated to defense or attack of a traded good, then its 
retention ratio is defined as unity, and there is no appropriation.  The vulnerability parameters ZX 
and ZY are determined exogenously and reflect the relative effectiveness of attack versus defense 
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effort.  For example, if jZ  equals 2, then the technology of conflict is such that attack effort is 
twice as effective as defense effort.  When the vulnerability parameters are equal, we denote 
their common value by Z.4 
As noted above, we refer to the case of identical homothetic preferences with equal cross 
endowments and equal vulnerability parameters as complete symmetry.  The resulting 
equilibrium is characterized by equal cross consumptions (XA = YB and YA = XA), defense efforts 
)( XB
Y
A hh = , and attack efforts )( YBXA gg = , together with a world relative price of 1.0.  In the 
Appendix we present an explicit reduced-form solution for the case of complete symmetry with 
CES utility functions and ratio-form contest success functions.  Unfortunately, the solution is 
unwieldy.  Hence, below we explore the comparative statics of vulnerable trade through a series 
examples solved independently by numerical methods.5 
Base Case with Complete Symmetry 
Figure 2 is constructed assuming complete symmetry with Cobb-Douglas preferences and 
with initial endowments )800,100(),( =YAXA EE  and )100,800(),( =YBXB EE .  The example 
constitutes the base case when we explore comparative statics in subsequent examples. 
In the classic Edgeworth box, trade is secure with Z equal to 0.  Mutual gains accrue when A 
and B trade from the initial endowment point a to the final consumption point e at the world 
relative price 0.1=P .  Player A imports 350 units of X and exports 350 units of Y, with B on the 
opposite side of trade.  Each player consumes 450 units of each good and enjoys an increase in 
utility from 282.8 (equal to 1001/28001/2) under autarky to 450.0 with trade. 
Appropriation possibilities are introduced by increasing Z to 0.5.  The arrow in the top right 
of Figure 2 shows how the dimensions of the Edgeworth box shrink when resources are drained 
in the defense and attack of trade.  The upper and right boundaries of the reduced box are shown 
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with bold dashed lines.  Because these two boundaries constitute the effective axes for player B, 
B's indifference curves shift relative to the original Edgeworth box.  The dimensions of the 
reduced box are determined endogenously by the players' defense and attack choices.  In 
equilibrium, player A allocates 1.75=YAh  units of its Y endowment to defend its gross exports 
and 0.55=XAg  units of its X endowment to attack B's gross exports.  Player B defends and 
attacks at equal levels of the opposite endowments.  Due to these resource costs, the effective 
endowment point shifts from a to b, reducing holdings for A and B to (45.0,724.9) and 
(724.9,45.0).  As the players allocate resources to defense and appropriation of trade, the 
aggregate economy suffers a resource cost of 130.1 units of each good. 
Appropriation and exchange together determine final consumption at point d in Figure 2 with 
)5.444,4.325(),( =AA YX  and )4.325,5.444(),( =BB YX .  Appropriation pushes the economy 
from point b to c, while exchange allows it to move from c to d.  Player A's gross exports of Y 
encompass 75.1 units seized by B together with 205.3 units successfully exchanged.  The same 
numbers apply to B for good X.  Hence, the piracy rates of X and Y are each 26.8% (equal to 
75.1/(75.1+205.3), or equivalently 732.011 −=− jir ).  Recall that secure trade generates exports 
of 350 units of each good, whereas vulnerable trade here yields realized exports of 205.3 units of 
each.  Hence, the trade destruction rate in Figure 2 for each good is 41.3% (equal to (350-
205.3)/350). 
A region of mutual gain remains at the final consumption point d due to the wedge effect 
whereby the players' effective relative prices of X fail to converge.  At the final equilibrium the 
effective relative prices of X, and hence the corresponding marginal rates of substitution, are 
366.1=AP  (equal to 732.0/1/ =YArP ) and 732.0=BP  (equal to 732.01⋅=XBPr ).  Player A is 
indifferent to importing a marginal unit of X at a price of 1.0, because given the piracy rate for Y, 
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A would have to make available for export 1.366 units of Y, just equal to A's subjective value of 
X in consumption.  On the other side, player B is indifferent to exporting a marginal unit of X at a 
contractual price of 1.0, because given the piracy rate for X, B would receive as net payment only 
0.732 units of Y, just equal to B's subjective value of X in consumption. 
The model of vulnerable trade assumes that only traded goods are subject to appropriation 
and that each player may consume his or her full initial endowment in autarky.  Hence, mutual 
gains are assured on any realized voluntary trade.  Between the initial endowment point a and the 
final consumption point d, each player's utility increases from 282.2 in autarky to 380.3 (equal to 
325.41/2444.51/2) under appropriation and trade.  At the same time, due to the resource cost and 
wedge effects, utilities fall well short of the 450.0 that would be enjoyed in the classic 
Edgeworth box economy.6 
Increased Vulnerability with Complete Symmetry 
In Figure 3 we explore the effects of increased vulnerability under conditions of complete 
symmetry by raising Z to 2.0.  Whereas defense is twice as effective as attack effort in Figure 2; 
now the reverse is true.  All other parameters remain the same.  Included in Figure 3 are 
numerical details, which we pass over here.  A visual comparison of the Figures 2 and 3 reveals 
some minor changes in resource costs and appropriation levels.  The more prominent and, it 
turns out, more general effect is the diminution of trade due to the widened price wedge.  As 
each good becomes more vulnerable, its corresponding retention rate ijr  decreases in 
equilibrium.  This in turn raises the import price of good X to player A and lowers the export 
price of X to B, for reasons explained previously.  The widened price wedge decreases exchange 
and hence players' utilities, as suggested by the noticeably larger region of mutual gain left 
untapped at the final consumption point. 
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To explore the effects of vulnerability further, we calculated additional solutions using the 
same parameters as in Figures 2 and 3 but with alternative vulnerability levels.  The details are 
reported in Table 1.  Three observations are in order.  First, the relationship between 
vulnerability and the wedge effect is evident across the full range of vulnerabilities in the table.  
As vulnerability increases, the wedge between effective prices widens and trade flows diminish.  
Second, the relationships between vulnerability on the one hand and resource costs and 
appropriation levels on the other are nonmonotonic.  When vulnerability increases from very low 
levels, fortification, attack, and appropriation initially increase as might be expected.  However, 
as vulnerability continues to increase, the conflict variables eventually turn around and decrease 
as withdrawal of goods from trade diminishes appropriation opportunities.  Third, if vulnerability 
increases sufficiently in the table, resource costs, appropriation, and exchange all converge to 
zero.  The final outcome is the same as autarky, with the price wedge forming at the initial 
endowment point and leaving untapped the entire initial region of mutual gain.  We return to this 
case of autarky by convergence in Section 4 below. 
Increased Vulnerability of One Good Only 
We turn now to the question of what happens when vulnerability increases for one good only.  
With Figure 2 serving again as the base case, in Figure 4 we increase the vulnerability of Y from 
0.5 to 2.0, while holding the vulnerability of X constant at 0.5.  Among the contrasts evident 
between Figures 2 and 4, the more important one is again the diminution of trade due to a larger 
price wedge.  Notice in Figure 4, however, that the wedge is skewed against player A around a 
world price below 1.0.  All else equal, an increase in ZY reduces the retention rate YAr  and hence 
raises player A's effective import price YAA rPP /= .  This in turn decreases demand for X and 
lowers the equilibrium world price.  Predictably, the increased vulnerability of Y works against 
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the interests of player A, who holds a comparative advantage in the more vulnerable good.  
Player A suffers not only reduced trade due to the wedge effect but also increased piracy from 
player B.7 
In Table 2 we place the examples of Figures 2 and 4 in the context of a series of solutions for 
increasing levels of vulnerability of good Y.  With details left to the table, we highlight several 
principles.  When vulnerability of Y increases, the world price falls, the price wedge widens, and 
trade diminishes.  Decreased trade in X reduces appropriation opportunities, so that equilibrium 
defense, attack, and appropriation of good X likewise diminish.  In contrast, the same variables 
for good Y first rise as increasing vulnerability shifts incentives toward conflict.  Eventually, the 
widening price wedge turns these variables downward, reinforced by some economizing of 
attack resources made possible by their greater effectiveness.  Player B's utility is bolstered by 
piracy but depressed by resource cost and wedge effects.  With the comparative advantage in Y, 
Player A loses on all counts.  A's utility falls steadily until A is rendered indifferent between trade 
and autarky at a vulnerability level ZY = 28.5. 
We illustrate this case of autarky by indifference with ZY = 28.5 in Figure 5, which shows the 
price wedge further widened and skewed against player A.  After allowing for resource costs and 
appropriation, trade places the players at point d, lying precisely on A's indifference curve 
passing through the initial endowment point a.  Any further increase in vulnerability causes 
player A to forgo trade, shifting the economy to autarky.  We pursue questions pertaining to 
vulnerable trade and autarky more closely in the next section. 
IV.  VULNERABLE TRADE AND AUTARKY 
We employ again the assumption of complete symmetry to explore two related questions:  
What determines the level of vulnerability that cuts off trade, and what characterizes the 
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emergence of autarky as an equilibrium?  We begin with tentative answers to the two questions 
and then follow with evidence from numerical solutions. 
The level of vulnerability at which trade is extinguished depends on the mutual gains that 
would be available if trade were secure.  The greater the potential gains in the classic Edgeworth 
box economy, the more robust is trade with respect to increases in vulnerability.  The potential 
gains in turn depend on the initial endowment point and the curvature of the indifference curves.  
The farther the endowment point from the contract curve and the more convex the indifference 
curves, the greater is the vulnerability level that cuts off trade. 
Turning to the second question, increased vulnerability can generate autarky in two distinct 
ways, as discovered in the preceding section.  The trade equilibrium can leave one or both 
players at a utility level equal to that under autarky, so that they are willing to forgo trade.  Any 
gains to realized trade are offset by resource costs and appropriation losses.  In terms of our 
Edgeworth box figures with complete symmetry, the final consumption point d falls at the 
intersection of respective indifference curves corresponding to the initial-endowment utilities.  
This is autarky by indifference.  Alternatively, the wedge effect can drive exports and likewise 
defense, attack, and appropriation to zero.  In terms of the figures, the final consumption point d 
converges to the initial endowment point a.  This is autarky by convergence. 
Seeking support for these answers, we ran a series of computations for alternative CES utility 
functions (σ = ½, 1, 2, and 3) under conditions of complete symmetry, but with endowments 
only partially fixed )100( == YBXA EE .  For values of Z from 0 to 5.0, we computed 
corresponding endowment values )( XB
Y
A EE =  for which players' utilities at the trade equilibrium 
just equaled their utilities under autarky.  We present the results in Figure 6.  For each elasticity 
of substitution, we plot a locus of points above which combinations of vulnerability and relative 
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endowment disparity generate trade and below which they yield autarky.8  To anticipate, the 
results confirm the answers above, but they also hold several surprises. 
Figure 6 shows that the level of vulnerability at which trade is extinguished is systematically 
related to relative endowment disparity and elasticity of substitution.  Holding relative 
endowments fixed, the smaller the elasticity of substitution, and hence the more convex the 
indifference curves, the larger is the critical level of vulnerability.  As a result, trade is more 
robust to vulnerability when substitutability between goods is low.  For example, at point m for 
which vulnerability is 0.1=Z  and A's relative endowment is 6100/600/ ==XAYA EE , trade will 
fail to emerge if 3=σ  but arise if 2=σ .  It is also true that holding substitutability constant, the 
larger is the relative endowment disparity, then the greater is the minimum vulnerability at which 
trade is extinguished.  Accordingly, trade is more robust when the difference in relative 
endowments is larger.  For example, suppose 0.1=Z  and 3=σ .  Then trade will not exist when 
A's relative endowment is 6100/600/ ==XAYA EE  at point m but will arise when it is 
10100/1000 =  at point p. 
As mentioned above, Figure 6 presents some surprises, foremost of which is the 
nonmonotonic pattern of the trade-autarky loci.  The implication is that holding endowment 
disparity and substitutability constant, increases in vulnerability can shift an economy from trade 
to autarky, back to trade, and then again to autarky.  For example, consider in Figure 6 the 
dashed horizontal line plotted for increasing levels of vulnerability, holding endowment disparity 
and substitutability fixed at 25.8100/825/ ==XAYA EE  and 3=σ .  As vulnerability increases, 
trade reigns until indifference point u, is taken over by autarky until indifference point v, 
emerges again up to convergence point w, and is extinguished for all points beyond.  The 
numerical details for these shifts between trade and autarky are presented in Table 3. 
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The movements between trade and autarky can be understood in terms of the principles 
discovered in the preceding sections.  Recall that trade vulnerability generates both a resource 
cost effect and a wedge effect on players' utilities.  The first effect refers to the diversion of 
resources for defense and attack, while the second refers to the spread between effective export 
and import prices due to piracy.  Also recall that the resource cost effect is nonmonotonic.  
Resource costs first increase with vulnerability but then diminish as defense and attack levels 
converge to zero.  The wedge effect, on the other hand, increases relentlessly.  Together this 
means that as vulnerability increases beyond comparatively low levels, a tradeoff arises between 
trade promotion due to reduced allocations to defense and attack and trade hindrance due to a 
widened price wedge. 
Now apply these principles to the increases in vulnerability along the dashed line of Figure 6.  
As the economy approaches point u, the resource cost effect diminishes, thus increasing the 
amount of goods available for gross exports.  The increasing wedge effect dominates, however, 
reducing the potential gains available from gross exports.  At point u players become indifferent 
to trade, and with further increases in vulnerability they opt out of trade.  None of this is too 
remarkable.  The surprise comes in the movement from point u to a second indifference point v.  
Somewhere along this path the resource cost effect diminishes at a rate sufficient to offset the 
increasing wedge effect.  Prospective utilities increase until players become indifferent to trade at 
point v and then opt back into trade with further movement to the right.  Eventually the resource 
cost effect diminishes at a diminishing rate, as defense and attack levels are reduced toward zero.  
The still increasing wedge effect reasserts its dominance until trade converges to autarky at point 
w.  Beyond this point, A's effective price of X becomes too high and B's too low to permit 
advantageous trade, and autarky rules. 
ANDERTON & CARTER:  VULNERABLE TRADE 
 18
V.  CONCLUSION 
Only in recent decades has appropriation begun to be treated as a basic form of economic 
activity.  Perhaps the artificial separation of exchange and appropriation traces back to Adam 
Smith.  As Smith (1976 [1776], 17) so famously observed, "the propensity to truck, barter, and 
exchange … is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals ….  Nobody ever 
saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange … with another dog."  Following Smith, the 
economics discipline has emphasized something that distinguishes humans from other animals:  
mutually beneficial exchange.  Generally ignored has been what makes humans similar to 
animals:  the propensity to appropriate and defend.  Standard models of exchange assume that 
people and property are perfectly secure, thus ignoring the contrary conditions pervasive in all 
economies to greater or lesser degrees.  When people and property are insecure, opportunities 
exist to forcibly seize wealth.  Scarce resources are allocated to appropriation and defense, 
wealth is redistributed, and consumption and trade are reduced. 
In our model of vulnerable trade we assume that goods are subject to appropriation if and 
only if they are offered for trade.  Initial endowments and the technology of conflict are 
exogenous; all other variables are determined endogenously.  As expected in a general 
equilibrium model, the introduction of appropriation opportunities changes everything relative to 
the classic Edgeworth box economy, sometimes in unanticipated ways.  Assuming non-
prohibitive levels of vulnerability, appropriation possibilities create incentives to allocate 
resources to the seizure and defense of goods offered for trade.  This resource cost causes the 
Edgeworth box to shrink, implying a reduction in goods available for consumption.  In the 
reduced box an equilibrium emerges that includes both coerced redistribution and voluntary 
trade.  Resource allocations together with the technology of conflict determine each good's 
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piracy rate, measured as the percentage of gross exports appropriated.  Goods not seized are 
realized exports and trade at the Walrasian relative price.  At the final equilibrium, potential 
mutual gains remain untaken because the prospect of piracy creates a price wedge, lowering the 
effective relative price for the exporting player and raising it for the importing player.  In cases 
of asymmetric vulnerability, the price wedge is skewed against the interests of the exporter of the 
more vulnerable good. 
As the vulnerability of one or both goods increases, the price wedge widens, causing trade to 
diminish.  The effects on resource costs and appropriation levels are nonmonotonic, however.  
While investments in conflict initially increase, the reduction in goods offered for trade decreases 
appropriation opportunities.  This in turn eventually causes resource costs and appropriation 
levels to diminish.  If vulnerability becomes sufficiently high, then trade and appropriation are 
driven to zero, or one or both players are rendered indifferent to trade.  In either way, autarky 
arises as the equilibrium outcome.  Whereas traditional economics assumes that exchange 
generates gains relative to autarky, with appropriation possibilities autarky can be preferred to 
exchange.  Even when exchange emerges over autarky, appropriation possibilities complicate 
exchange in ways that are generally ignored in economic theory. 
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1. For models of production and appropriation, see Brito and Intriligator (1985), 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), Grossman and Kim (1995), Hirshleifer (1995), Neary (1997), 
Skaperdas (1992), and Usher (1989).  Models of exchange and appropriation include Anderton 
and Anderton (1997), Anderton (1999), and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002).  For models that 
combine production, exchange, and appropriation see Anderson and Marcoullier (2001), 
Anderton et al. (1999), Anderton (2003), Hausken (2003), and Rider (2002).  Experimental tests 
of models with production and appropriation include Durham et al. (1998) and Carter and 
Anderton (2001).  
2. To our knowledge, Anderson and Marcoullier (2001) offer the only other general 
equilibrium model of trade and appropriation where autarky arises as an equilibrium outcome 
under certain conditions. 
3. Once appropriated, goods are not traded; once traded, they are not appropriated. 
4. On contest success functions, see Hirshleifer (1989, 2000) and Skaperdas (1996).  Our 
particular contest success function is identical to that of Grossman and Kim (1995). 
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5. Numerical solutions were computed with Maple 8.00 and are available from the 
authors upon request.  In cases of complete symmetry, selected computations were checked 
against the analytical solution in the Appendix. 
6. An interesting feature discovered in this and subsequent numerical examples is that 
one player's optimal fortification equals the other player's appropriation of the same good.  For 
A's fortification of good Y, the result is easily proven from A's first-order condition (7) together 
with the ratio-form contest success function (10).  After substituting YAYA hr ∂∂  from (10) and 
simplifying, (7) can be written as ( ) ( )( )YBYYAYBYAYAYAYA gZhgZYhEh +−−= , where the right-hand 
side equals B's appropriation of good Y.  A similar proof holds for B's fortification of X. 
7. Our model of vulnerable trade easily accommodates the special case of player A as 
prey and player B as predator.  Because both Player A's attack and player B's fortification equal 
zero, player B's retention ratio equals one by definition.  Player B's effective price thus equals the 
world price, and the wedge is formed between that price and A's effective price. 
8. A locus of ),( YAEZ  points showing autarky by convergence is derived by setting the 
numerator of equation (A.1) in the Appendix to zero.  The resulting ),( YAEZ  points give h = 0, 
g = 0, YA = EAY, and XA = EAX in equations (A.1)-(A.4), confirming autarky by convergence.  The 
denominator in (A.1) can be shown to be positive, which implies that ∂h/∂EAY is positive and 
independent of EAY.  Hence, autarky exists for all ),( YAEZ  points on and below the autarky-by-
convergence locus.  Points above the autarky-by-convergence locus do not necessarily imply 
trade because trade can leave players worse off than under autarky.  For ),( YAEZ  points above the 
autarky-by-convergence locus, our computations reveal trade for Z ≥ 2.  For Z < 2, ),( YAEZ  
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points directly above the autarky-by-convergence locus show autarky dominating trade until the 
concave autarky-by-indifference locus is reached, above which trade reigns. 
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TABLE 1 
Increasing Vulnerability with Complete Symmetrya 
Z XA=YB YA=XB h g P Approp
Realized
Exports r PA PB U
0.0 450.0 450.0 0.0 0.0 1.00 0.0 350.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 450.0
0.1 404.9 442.0 27.7 25.4 1.00 27.7 302.6 0.92 1.09 0.92 423.0
0.2 375.4 439.5 45.9 39.2 1.00 45.9 268.7 0.85 1.17 0.85 406.2
0.3 354.2 439.8 58.7 47.3 1.00 58.7 242.8 0.81 1.24 0.81 394.7
0.4 338.2 441.7 68.0 52.1 1.00 68.0 222.2 0.77 1.31 0.77 386.5
0.5 325.4 444.5 75.1 55.0 1.00 75.1 205.3 0.73 1.37 0.73 380.3
0.6 314.9 447.8 80.6 56.7 1.00 80.6 191.0 0.70 1.42 0.70 375.5
0.7 306.1 451.4 84.9 57.6 1.00 84.9 178.8 0.68 1.47 0.68 371.8
0.8 298.6 455.3 88.3 57.9 1.00 88.3 168.2 0.66 1.52 0.66 368.7
0.9 292.0 459.2 91.0 57.8 1.00 91.0 158.9 0.64 1.57 0.64 366.2
1.0 286.2 463.1 93.1 57.5 1.00 93.1 150.7 0.62 1.62 0.62 364.1
2.0 250.0 500.0 100.0 50.0 1.00 100.0 100.0 0.50 2.00 0.50 353.6
3.0 230.1 529.9 97.6 42.4 1.00 97.6 74.9 0.43 2.30 0.43 349.2
4.0 216.4 554.2 93.1 36.3 1.00 93.1 59.6 0.39 2.56 0.39 346.3
5.0 205.8 574.4 88.2 31.6 1.00 88.2 49.2 0.36 2.79 0.36 343.8
10.0 173.4 641.8 66.7 18.0 1.00 66.7 24.7 0.27 3.70 0.27 333.6
20.0 142.0 710.0 40.0 8.0 1.00 40.0 10.0 0.20 5.00 0.20 317.5
30.0 124.6 747.6 23.8 4.0 1.00 23.8 4.8 0.17 6.00 0.17 305.2
40.0 112.9 772.7 12.6 1.8 1.00 12.6 2.2 0.15 6.84 0.15 295.4
50.0 104.2 791.1 4.2 0.5 1.00 4.2 0.6 0.13 7.59 0.13 287.2
56.0 100.0 800.0 0.0 0.0 1.00 0.0 0.0 0.12 8.03 0.12 282.8
aSimulations assume Cobb-Douglas utility, ZX=ZY, )800,100(),( =YAXA EE , and )100,800(),( =YBXB EE . Autarky utility equals 282.8. 
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TABLE 2 
Increasing Vulnerability for One Good Onlya 
ZY XA YA hAY gAX XB YB hBX gBY P AppAX AppBY
Realized
ExpAY 
Realized
ExpBX rAY PA rBX PB UA UB
0.5 325.4 444.5 75.1 55.0 444.5 325.4 75.1 55.0 1.00 75.1 75.1 205.3 205.3 0.73 1.37 0.73 0.73 380.3 380.3
0.6 321.2 441.2 82.1 54.0 451.1 319.0 73.7 57.7 0.97 73.7 82.1 194.6 201.5 0.70 1.37 0.73 0.71 376.5 379.3
0.7 317.3 438.5 88.0 53.0 457.3 313.8 72.4 59.7 0.94 72.4 88.0 185.4 197.9 0.68 1.38 0.73 0.69 373.0 378.8
0.8 313.5 436.3 93.1 52.1 463.2 309.5 71.2 61.1 0.91 71.2 93.1 177.5 194.4 0.66 1.39 0.73 0.67 369.8 378.7
0.9 309.9 434.4 97.6 51.2 468.8 306.0 70.0 62.0 0.89 70.0 97.6 170.4 191.2 0.64 1.40 0.73 0.65 367.0 378.7
1.0 306.6 432.9 101.5 50.4 474.2 302.9 68.9 62.7 0.87 68.9 101.5 164.2 188.1 0.62 1.41 0.73 0.64 364.3 379.0
2.0 280.1 425.9 124.7 44.0 515.9 287.1 60.0 62.4 0.76 60.0 124.7 124.7 164.1 0.50 1.52 0.73 0.56 345.4 384.8
3.0 262.1 425.1 135.5 39.6 544.3 280.6 54.0 58.8 0.70 54.0 135.5 104.0 147.6 0.43 1.62 0.73 0.52 333.8 390.8
4.0 248.7 426.3 141.5 36.3 565.4 276.9 49.6 55.3 0.67 49.6 141.5 90.6 135.5 0.39 1.71 0.73 0.49 325.6 395.7
5.0 238.3 428.3 145.3 33.7 581.9 274.3 46.1 52.0 0.64 46.1 145.3 81.1 125.9 0.36 1.80 0.73 0.47 319.5 399.5
10.0 206.8 441.2 151.4 26.0 631.6 266.5 35.6 40.9 0.58 35.6 151.4 56.0 97.2 0.27 2.13 0.73 0.42 302.0 410.3
15.0 189.9 453.4 151.1 21.9 658.2 261.2 30.0 34.3 0.54 30.0 151.1 44.4 81.9 0.23 2.39 0.73 0.40 293.4 414.6
20.0 178.9 464.3 149.2 19.3 675.5 256.7 26.3 29.8 0.52 26.3 149.2 37.3 71.9 0.20 2.59 0.73 0.38 288.2 416.4
25.0 171.0 474.0 146.8 17.3 688.0 252.7 23.7 26.6 0.50 23.7 146.8 32.4 64.7 0.18 2.77 0.73 0.37 284.7 416.9
28.5 166.6 480.2 145.0 16.3 694.9 250.1 22.2 24.7 0.49 22.2 145.0 29.8 60.7 0.17 2.88 0.73 0.36 282.8 416.9
aSimulations assume Cobb-Douglas utility, ZX = 0.5, )800,100(),( =YAXA EE , and )100,800(),( =YBXB EE . Autarky utility equals 282.8.  
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TABLE 3 
Trade and Autarky with Increasing Vulnerability and Complete Symmetrya 
Z XA=YB YA=XB h g P Approp
Realized
Exports r PA PB U Outcome
0.00 462.5 462.5 0.0 0.0 1.00 0.0 362.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1308.15 Trade
0.10 380.8 495.3 25.5 23.4 1.00 25.5 278.6 0.92 1.09 0.92 1235.44 Trade
0.20 328.0 526.5 38.0 32.5 1.00 38.0 222.5 0.85 1.17 0.85 1197.49 Trade
0.30 290.2 555.5 43.9 35.4 1.00 43.9 181.7 0.81 1.24 0.81 1175.98 Trade
0.40 261.3 582.3 46.1 35.3 1.00 46.1 150.5 0.77 1.31 0.77 1163.25 Trade
0.50 238.2 607.1 46.1 33.7 1.00 46.1 125.8 0.73 1.37 0.73 1155.54 Trade
0.60 219.1 629.9 44.7 31.4 1.00 44.7 105.8 0.70 1.42 0.70 1150.87 Trade
0.70 203.0 650.9 42.4 28.8 1.00 42.4 89.3 0.68 1.47 0.68 1148.06 Trade
0.80 189.1 670.3 39.6 26.0 1.00 39.6 75.5 0.66 1.52 0.66 1146.44 Trade
0.85 183.3 678.8 38.2 24.7 1.00 38.2 69.8 0.65 1.55 0.65 1145.96 Indifference
0.90 177.0 688.3 36.5 23.2 1.00 36.5 63.8 0.64 1.57 0.64 1145.56 Autarky
1.00 166.4 704.9 33.2 20.5 1.00 33.2 53.7 0.62 1.62 0.62 1145.15 Autarky
1.20 148.4 734.6 26.4 15.5 1.00 26.4 37.5 0.59 1.70 0.59 1145.08 Autarky
1.40 133.8 760.4 19.7 11.1 1.00 19.7 25.1 0.56 1.78 0.56 1145.39 Autarky
1.60 121.6 782.9 13.3 7.2 1.00 13.3 15.5 0.54 1.86 0.54 1145.74 Autarky
1.80 111.3 802.6 7.3 3.8 1.00 7.3 7.8 0.52 1.93 0.52 1145.95 Autarky
1.81 110.9 803.4 7.0 3.6 1.00 7.0 7.5 0.52 1.93 0.52 1145.96 Indifference
1.90 106.8 811.6 4.4 2.3 1.00 4.4 4.6 0.51 1.97 0.51 1145.99 Trade
2.00 102.5 820.0 1.7 0.8 1.00 1.7 1.7 0.50 2.00 0.50 1145.98 Trade
2.06 100.0 825.0 0.0 0.0 1.00 0.0 0.0 0.49 2.02 0.49 1145.96 Autarky
aSimulations assume CES (σ = 3) utility, ZX=ZY, )825,100(),( =YAXA EE , and )100,825(),( =YBXB EE . Autarky utility equals 1145.96. 
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FIGURE 1.  Illustration with Complete Symmetry 
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FIGURE 2.  Base Example with (ZX,ZY) = (0.5,0.5) 
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Key:
P  = world relative price of X = 1.000
PA  = effective price to A = 1.366
PB  = effective price to B = 0.732
a = initial endowment = (100,800)
b = after resource cost = (45.0,724.9)
c = after appropriation = (120.1,649.8)
d = final consumption = (325.4,444.5) 
e = classical consumption = 
               (450.0,450.0) 
hA = A's defense = 75.1 Y
gA = A's attack = 55.0 X
hB = B's defense = 75.1 X
gB = B's attack = 55.0 Y
Seized by A = 75.1 X
Seized by B = 75.1 Y
A's realized export = 205.3 Y
B's realized export = 205.3 X
Piracy Rate of X = 26.8%
Piracy Rate of Y = 26.8%
Trade Destruction Rate of X = 41.3%
Trade Destruction Rate of Y = 41.3%
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FIGURE 3.  Increased Vulnerability with (ZX,ZY) = (2.0,2.0) 
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Key:
P  = world relative price of X = 1.000
PA  = effective price to A = 2.000
PB  = effective price to B = 0.500
a = initial endowment = (100,800)
b = after resource cost = (50.0,700.0)
c = after appropriation = (150.0,600.0)
d = final consumption = (250.0,500.0) 
e = classical consumption = 
               (450.0,450.0) 
hA = A's defense = 100.0 Y
gA = A's attack = 50.0 X
hB = B's defense = 100.0 X
gB = B's attack = 50.0 Y
Seized by A = 100.0 X
Seized by B = 100.0 Y
A's realized export = 100.0 Y
B's realized export = 100.0 X
Piracy Rate of X = 50.0%
Piracy Rate of Y = 50.0%
Trade Destruction Rate of X = 71.4%
Trade Destruction Rate of Y = 71.4%
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FIGURE 4.  Increased Vulnerability with (ZX,ZY) = (0.5,2.0) 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Good X
G
o
o
d
 
Y
a
b
c
d
e
P
PB
PA
gA
hA
gA+hB
hA+gB
XB
seized
by B
  Key:
P  = world relative price of X = 0.760
PA  = effective price to A = 1.520
PB  = effective price to B = 0.556
a = initial endowment = (100,800)
b = after resource cost = (56.0,675.3)
c = after appropriation = (116.1,550.6)
d = final consumption = (280.1,425.9) 
e = classical consumption = 
               (450.0,450.0) 
hA = A's defense = 124.7 Y
gA = A's attack = 44.0 X
hB = B's defense = 60.0 X
gB = B's attack = 62.4 Y
Seized by A = 60.0 X
Seized by B = 124.7 Y
A's realized export = 124.7 Y
B's realized export = 164.1 X
Piracy Rate of X = 26.8%
Piracy Rate of Y = 50.0%
Trade Destruction Rate of X = 53.1%
Trade Destruction Rate of Y = 64.4%
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FIGURE 5.  Increased Vulnerability with (ZX,ZY) = (0.5,28.5) 
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Key:
P  = world relative price of X = 0.492
PA  = effective price to A = 2.883
PB  = effective price to B = 0.360
a = initial endowment = (100,800)
b = after resource cost = (83.7,655.0)
c = after appropriation = (105.9,510.0)
d = final consumption = (166.6,480.2) 
e = classical consumption = 
               (450.0,450.0) 
hA = A's defense = 145.0 Y
gA = A's attack = 16.3 X
hB = B's defense = 22.2 X
gB = B's attack = 24.7 Y
Seized by A = 22.2 X
Seized by B = 145.0 Y
A's realized export = 29.8 Y
B's realized export = 60.6 X
Piracy Rate of X = 26.8%
Piracy Rate of Y = 82.9%
Trade Destruction Rate of X = 82.7%
Trade Destruction Rate of Y = 91.5%
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FIGURE 6.  Autarky-Trade Loci 
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APPENDIX 
Reduced-Form Solution with Complete Symmetry, CES Utility, and Ratio CSF 
 
Reduced-Form Solution 
 
Assume complete symmetry (as defined in the paper), CES utility for each player A and B, 
and identical ratio contest success functions for each good (as defined by equations 10 and 11).  
The reduced-form solution for player A is: 
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Derivation of Reduced-Form Solution 
The first order conditions for player A (equations 6-8) under CES utility and ratio CSF imply: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) YAYBYAAAYAAA hZghPXYrPYX +=⇒= −− ρρ 11     (A.5) 
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Under symmetry, P = 1, hhh XBYA == , ggg YBXA == , XA = YB, YA = XB, XBYA EE = , and YBXA EE = .  
The symmetry information and equations (4) and (A.5)-(A.7) lead to: 
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 AYAXAA YghEEX −−−+=         (A.11) 
ANDERTON & CARTER:  VULNERABLE TRADE 
 37
Mathematica cannot solve equations (A.8)-(A.11) directly.  Hence, we proceed with manual 
substitutions and algebraic manipulations, assisted by Mathematica on some intermediate steps. 
To find the reduced-form solution for h, we substitute (A.9) into (A.8) and solve for YA: 
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We then plug (A.9) into (A.10) and again solve for YA: 
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Substituting the right side of (A.12) for YA in (A.13) and solving for h leads to equation (A.1). 
To find g, we substitute (A.12) into (A.9) and rearrange to obtain a single h term on the right: 
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We then plug the reduced-form solution for h into (A.14), which yields equation (A.2). 
To obtain YA, we substitute the solution for h into (A.12), which gives equation (A.3).  To 
find XA, we begin with equation (A.12), which implies: 
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Plugging (A.15) into the right side of (A.11) leads to: 
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Substituting (A.14) for g and then the reduced-form solution for h leads to equation (A.4). 
 Since the model is symmetric, the reduced-form solution for player A also implies the 
reduced-form solution for player B, that is, h = hA = hB, g = gA = gB, YA = XB, and XA = YB. 
